CVE-2026-90246
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check
verify_tags() validates the tagset table unpacked from a policy blob. For each set it reads a count and checks that advancing the index by that count stays inside sets.table[]:
u32 cnt = tags->sets.table[i];
if (i+cnt >= tags->sets.size) {
i, cnt and sets.size are all u32, so i+cnt is evaluated modulo 2^32. sets.table[] is filled by unpack_tagsets() with aa_unpack_u32(), so every entry is a raw unbounded 32-bit word taken from the policy blob, and verify_tags() is the function that is supposed to validate it. A count close to U32_MAX makes the sum wrap to a small value, the guard passes, and the inner loop then walks sets.table[++i] past the end of the kcalloc(size, sizeof(u32)) allocation.
Note that sets.size is bounded by 65535, because unpack_tagsets() reads it with aa_unpack_array() as a u16, so the wrap cannot be reached by growing the table; it is reached purely through the attacker-supplied count.
With sets.size = 2 and sets.table = { 0, 0xffffffff }:
i = 0: cnt = 0, guard 0 + 0 >= 2 is false, inner loop does not run i = 1: cnt = 0xffffffff, guard (1 + 0xffffffff) mod 2^32 == 0 >= 2 is false, so the guard is bypassed and the inner loop reads sets.table[2] – one element past a two element allocation
The walk continues until an out-of-bounds value happens to be >= hdrs.size or the access faults, so a crafted policy yields an out-of-bounds read on the policy load path (aa_replace_profiles -> aa_unpack -> unpack_policydb -> unpack_tags -> verify_tags). unpack_tags() runs before the perms and DFA tables are unpacked, so no other table needs to be well formed to reach it.
Policy load is gated by aa_may_manage_policy(), which checks CAP_MAC_ADMIN relative to the subject's own user namespace rather than the init user namespace, so with the default unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy=1 the path is reachable from an unprivileged task in a matched-level nested namespace, not only by a globally privileged one.
Perform the addition in u64 so that it cannot wrap, restoring the intended i + cnt < sets.size guarantee.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | 3d28e2397af7a89ac3de33c686ed404cda59b5d5 < ef79a405f83993f0fda5efde371d98433f7d7a47 | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 3d28e2397af7a89ac3de33c686ed404cda59b5d5 < 465946d3c560c0137e6a180ba054dddc4d049f5a | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 7.0 | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 0 < 7.0 | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 7.2.6 <= 7.2.* | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 7.3-rc1 <= * | unaffected |
Weaknesses
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef79a405f83993f0fda5efde371d98433f7d7a47
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/465946d3c560c0137e6a180ba054dddc4d049f5a
Feedback
Was this page helpful?
Glad to hear it! Please tell us how we can improve.
Sorry to hear that. Please tell us how we can improve.