CVE-2026-80970

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response

fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace:

buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size;

void *resp __free(kfree) =
	kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
...
if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size))
	return -EFAULT;

Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer:

err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0),
	FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0,
	USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN,
	0, private->bInterfaceNumber,
	step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size);
if (err < 0)
	return err;

usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success.

snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally:

buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL);
...
memcpy(data, buf, size);

Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512.

On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255:

init_on_alloc off, no spray

step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff

same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag

step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232

identical run, init_on_alloc=1

step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0

all three runs

step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62

a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region.

Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

Affected Software

Weaknesses

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9e52437120fb5f802152877ba20c4b406c9fa9e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/29ab2df278ab4f1d238cd9c1c393ee00db175cba
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4335e387786479889e6db691fe06d345e52ea536

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