CVE-2026-80810

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec()

io_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1:

unsigned long folio_size = 1 << imu->folio_shift;

imu->folio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the folio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit kernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the count is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G. Every other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL.

The result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree. io_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift:

max_segs += (iov[i].iov_len >> shift) + 2;

so a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while io_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4 bytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past the end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per iteration as well, so imu->bvec is read past its end at the same time. validate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the registered buffer and does not bound the segment count.

Reaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a gigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where CONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) registers that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so a shift of 30, which still fits in int and is unaffected.

Use 1UL, as the rest of the file does.

Affected Software

Weaknesses

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45c945107e007b1fb73e21cd220277652a45521a
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b308c37fbeba3aa8c634fb1ed53e2f63a5d5a5c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3267d7c8ba51642117f7bdd1ece02b2540668476
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f3a6a16bbe8bde76532d9415438f8cdef439e5d

• ←Previous
• Next→