CVE-2026-79784
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
Vocos instantiates a class named by a configuration file without restricting which class may be named. instantiate_class in vocos/pretrained.py takes the class_path value from the configuration, splits it into a module and an attribute, imports the module with import, resolves the attribute with getattr, and calls the result as args_class(*args, **kwargs) where kwargs is the config's own init_args mapping. No allowlist constrains the dotted path, so a configuration may name any importable callable and supply the arguments it is called with. Vocos.from_hparams reaches this for each of the feature_extractor, backbone and head entries, and Vocos.from_pretrained reaches it with a remote file: it downloads config.yaml from a caller-named Hugging Face repository and passes it straight to from_hparams. Loading a model from a repository the user does not control therefore executes code of the repository owner's choosing in the loading process. The neighbouring torch.load of the downloaded weights is a separate matter and is constrained on PyTorch releases that default weights_only to true, which leaves this path as the reachable one.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| gemelo-ai | vocos | 0 <= 0.1.0 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
References
- https://github.com/gemelo-ai/vocos
- https://github.com/gemelo-ai/vocos/issues/76
- https://github.com/gemelo-ai/vocos/blob/main/vocos/pretrained.py
- https://pypi.org/project/vocos/
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vocos-through-arbitrary-code-execution-via-unrestricted-class-path-in-model-configuration
Feedback
Was this page helpful?
Glad to hear it! Please tell us how we can improve.
Sorry to hear that. Please tell us how we can improve.