CVE-2026-75628
N/A
Summary
Punk::OAuth2 versions before 0.03 for Perl allow an attacker-chosen off-site redirect after login because same_origin_path accepts a backslash or tab in the return parameter.
oauth2_login reads the return parameter from the initiation request, runs same_origin_path over it, and stores the survivor in the session flow record as the post-login redirect target. That check rejects a value that does not begin with a slash, one with a slash as its second byte, and one containing CR or LF. A backslash and a tab pass. The URL Standard treats a backslash as equivalent to a slash for special schemes, so /\evil.example parses with the authority evil.example. It also strips ASCII tab before parsing, so a tab between two leading slashes leaves //evil.example.
A crafted link to the application's own login route lands the victim on the attacker's site after a genuine authentication. The redirect carries no authorization code or access token.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
0 < 0.03 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-601: CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
Workarounds
For deployments that cannot upgrade to 0.03, strip the return query parameter from requests to the oauth2_login initiation route at the reverse proxy. Logins then use the configured redirect_ok destination.
ADP Enrichment
CVE Program Container
Additional References
References
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-OAuth2-0.03/changes
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-OAuth2-0.02/source/include/pox/pox_util.h#L94
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9700#section-4.11.1
- https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#relative-slash-state
- https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser
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