CVE-2026-74905
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L
Summary
SiYuan before v3.7.4 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the isPrivateIP function in kernel/util/net.go, used by SSRFSafeDialer to enforce SSRF protection in SafeMode. The function only checks for loopback, link-local unicast, private, and unspecified addresses and does not recognize IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64 64:ff9b::/96, 6to4 2002::/16, Teredo 2001::/32) that embed private IPv4 destinations. When SafeMode is enabled, an authenticated attacker can bypass the SSRF guard via the network forward proxy, WebSocket proxy, or SSE proxy endpoints by supplying a URL whose hostname resolves to such a transition address, reaching internal services and cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254). Because the forward proxy returns the full response body, this is a full-read SSRF that can be used to steal instance credentials, reach internal services, and port-scan internal infrastructure.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| siyuan-note | siyuan | 0 < 3.7.4 | affected |
| siyuan-note | siyuan | 3.7.4 | unaffected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
References
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-qq8m-8p8v-x4xg
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-ssrf-via-ipv6-transition-address-bypass
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