CVE-2026-70557
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Summary
diboot-core's POST /common/load-related-data endpoint resolves caller-supplied field names to any @TableField column of any entity and returns those values for all rows, with no field or entity allowlist. The only guard, relatedDataSecurityCheck(), returns true unconditionally, so any authenticated user (including a zero-role account) can read @JsonIgnore-annotated secret fields such as IamAccount.authSecret and IamAccount.secretSalt for every account, or arbitrary secret fields of any other entity. Shiro's two-iteration MD5 with an 8-character salt is trivially crackable offline, so the disclosed admin password hashes convert to full administrative takeover. The endpoint is not example code; the official diboot-admin-ui frontend requires it, so deployments following the vendor's recommended integration expose it. The mechanism was renamed relatedData* to attachMore* on the development branch, but attachMoreSecurityCheck() also returns true unconditionally.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| diboot | diboot-core | 0 <= 3.9.0 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-639: CWE-639 Authorization bypass through User-Controlled key
References
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