CVE-2026-69198
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. From 10.1.1 until 10.2.2, every special-use classification method is built on isInSubnet, which short-circuits to false whenever the address's own subnet mask is shorter than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as /0 suppresses classification entirely: isLoopback(), isPrivate(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isMulticast(), isUnspecified(), isBroadcast(), isULA(), and getType() all report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the real internal target. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. The underlying bit comparison is correct, and mask(n) already returns the first n bits of the full parsed address independently of subnetMask; the defect is solely that the containment guard sits in the classification path. This issue is fixed in version 10.2.2.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| beaugunderson | ip-address | >= 10.1.1, < 10.2.2 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-20: CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
- CWE-918: CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
References
- https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh
- https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/commit/488fe9bc7c35363b4b090494fc38c266d217740d
- https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/releases/tag/v10.2.2
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