CVE-2026-68196

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header

wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as

ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res);

without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be validated before the driver accesses the fixed header.

For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps. For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of 65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data (CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3.

Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure on this path: the caller falls through to a "conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short response be treated as a successful association.

Affected Software

Weaknesses

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/584c8954ad55f8b09b475be6db710fe40ceb988c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d410320e8ae5933e651660c9fadc1d380309e23
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e511e93abd6eeedcd5b3c55516241f414fbde64a
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ccdf8c8de87a9580df37c3c1ec53ba88cedef65
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c4c97b60a5e978121d9ee8cb0ab3916e5d6a8de

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