CVE-2026-63920
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg
ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250 sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620
Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct bound.
Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR) and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop (DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2).
The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1].
When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the function instead of continuing to process later socket options.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < 81394827dfb72772c50d0ae3bdfa094428a5d76d | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < 931b4a1f13408c2507719890f78f7227c34a0282 | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < 08464413e628803bd10cb1df68d0138665f2f885 | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < a29768d56eb3798c052ad3281b05596e695a17af | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < 0d330eff318c0f44d4fb0ad2c2aef38f87f24c90 | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < a35daeabb433686234b010ebf7b53778dbd6c9b8 | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < eb18a1b1644e4cad978df2131e2bb9a2e6886992 | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < dd433671fef381fdaf7b530c631e6b782d66e224 | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 2.6.12 | affected |
| Linux | Linux | 0 < 2.6.12 | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 5.10.259 <= 5.10.* | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 5.15.210 <= 5.15.* | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 6.1.176 <= 6.1.* | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 6.6.143 <= 6.6.* | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 6.12.93 <= 6.12.* | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 6.18.35 <= 6.18.* | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 7.0.12 <= 7.0.* | unaffected |
| Linux | Linux | 7.1 <= * | unaffected |
Weaknesses
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81394827dfb72772c50d0ae3bdfa094428a5d76d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/931b4a1f13408c2507719890f78f7227c34a0282
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08464413e628803bd10cb1df68d0138665f2f885
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a29768d56eb3798c052ad3281b05596e695a17af
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d330eff318c0f44d4fb0ad2c2aef38f87f24c90
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a35daeabb433686234b010ebf7b53778dbd6c9b8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb18a1b1644e4cad978df2131e2bb9a2e6886992
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd433671fef381fdaf7b530c631e6b782d66e224
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