CVE-2026-61536

Summary

Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. In versions prior to 2.4.3, banks parses Tool JSON objects from the rendered body of {% completion %} blocks and later resolves their import_path field through importlib.import_module(…) + getattr(…) to obtain the callable that handles a tool call. There is no allowlist or sanitization on import_path, so any importable Python attribute (e.g. os.system, subprocess.getoutput) can be selected. When the LLM emits a tool_calls entry whose function.name matches the attacker-supplied tool name, the resolved callable is invoked with kwargs decoded from tool_call.function.arguments, yielding arbitrary code execution in the banks-hosting process. This is distinct from GHSA-gphh-9q3h-jgpp / CVE-2026-44209. That advisory was fixed in 2.4.2 by switching src/banks/env.py from Environment to SandboxedEnvironment. The fix does not touch src/banks/extensions/completion.py, and the unsafe import + getattr chain still executes on 2.4.2. The malicious Tool JSON is plain text in the rendered template body — it requires no Jinja attribute access, so the sandbox is irrelevant. This issue has been fixed in version 2.4.3.

Affected Software

Weaknesses

• CWE-94: CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
• CWE-470: CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')

References

• https://github.com/masci/banks/security/advisories/GHSA-64vx-6h2c-rjh7

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