CVE-2026-59941
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. Versions 3.15 and prior accept a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000×6000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas. A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,… URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. I measured a 169-byte request driving a dompdf render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated. This issue has been fixed in version 3.16.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| dompdf | dompdf | < 3.1.6 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-400: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
References
- https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m
- https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/7c65e7bbeccf146b2409740405af73949ad129d0
- https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/releases/tag/v3.1.6
Feedback
Was this page helpful?
Glad to hear it! Please tell us how we can improve.
Sorry to hear that. Please tell us how we can improve.