CVE-2026-58504
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Summary
draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.5, opening or importing a crafted .drawio file can execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the draw.io origin when selected cells are processed by TextFormatPanel.addFont() in src/main/webapp/js/grapheditor/Format.js. An HTML sibling cell keeps the formatted-label path enabled while an editable=0 plain-text sibling is excluded from the merged selection style but remains in the iteration set. graph.cellRenderer.getLabelValue() returns that plain-text label without HTML encoding, and mxUtils.canConvertHtmlToSvg() parses it as HTML, bypassing the earlier CVE-2026-46642 remediation. Successful exploitation can expose diagram data, browser storage, non-HttpOnly cookies, and same-origin actions available to the victim. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.5.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| jgraph | drawio | < 30.2.5 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-79: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
- CWE-116: CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
References
- https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/security/advisories/GHSA-c76x-r78m-phwx
- https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/commit/7976c02e1b10b1687c028d82782f9f5d90a885d6
- https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/releases/tag/v30.2.5
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