CVE-2026-54508
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: 'follow' instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| mauriceboe | TREK | < 3.1.0 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-918: CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
References
- https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/security/advisories/GHSA-f5vh-p2h5-x735
- https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/pull/1185
- https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/commit/ad893eb1cc75b6d56f402d73a6d41bd48ba7ae11
- https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/releases/tag/v3.1.0
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