CVE-2026-54352
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Summary
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, POST /api/pwa/process-zip at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with extract-zip@2.0.1 into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. extract-zip@2.0.1 preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Budibase | budibase | < 3.39.9 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-22: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
- CWE-59: CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
ADP Enrichment
CISA ADP Vulnrichment
- SSVC:
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical Impact: total
Additional References
References
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