CVE-2026-49454
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Summary
Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| szTheory | relyra | >= 1.0.0, < 1.2.0 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-287: CWE-287: Improper Authentication
- CWE-347: CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
ADP Enrichment
CISA ADP Vulnrichment
- SSVC:
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical Impact: total
References
- https://github.com/szTheory/relyra/security/advisories/GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7
- https://github.com/szTheory/relyra/commit/2e456897af3158c175bb490ce7fc51d6241c8922
- https://github.com/szTheory/relyra/commit/8910200
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