CVE-2026-48737
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L
Summary
pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to 0.5.0b3.dev101, is_global_address in src/pyload/core/utils/web/check.py relies on Python's global-address classification without examining IPv4 destinations embedded in 6to4 or NAT64 IPv6 addresses. A low-privileged user can submit an IPv6 literal through parse_urls to the pre-resolution is_global_host guard. Because host_to_ip is pinned to AF_INET, that guard does not evaluate a hostname's AAAA result. Separately, curl resolves hostnames before the pycurl PREREQFUNC in src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py applies the same vulnerable is_global_address check to the actual connection address, so a transition-form AAAA result can be permitted even when it terminates at an embedded loopback, private, CGNAT, or link-local IPv4 address. Exploitation requires the pyLoad host to route the applicable transition mechanism, including 6to4 on affected Python 3.9 through 3.11 deployments or NAT64 on a network with a NAT64 gateway. Successful exploitation can enable internal-network reconnaissance, timing-based confirmation, limited service disruption, or cloud metadata disclosure where the wrapped address is routable. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0b3.dev101.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| pyload | pyload | < 0.5.0b3.dev101 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-918: CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
References
- https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-m5x5-28jr-gpjj
- https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/ba7491046b2d430732be490913e4cbf1f1e899c2
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