CVE-2026-46340
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions of netty-transport-sctp prior to 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, for each non-complete SctpMessage fragment the handler does fragments.put(streamId, Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(frag, byteBuf)), wrapping the previous accumulator and the new slice into a new CompositeByteBuf every time. After N fragments the accumulator is an N-deep chain of composites, each holding references and component arrays; readableBytes()/getBytes() on the final buffer recurse N levels. There is no limit on N, on total bytes, or on the number of streamIdentifiers an attacker can open (each gets its own map entry). A peer that never sets the complete flag can grow this structure indefinitely from tiny 1-byte DATA chunks. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| netty | netty | >= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.15.Final | affected |
| netty | netty | < 4.1.135.Final | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-770: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
ADP Enrichment
CISA ADP Vulnrichment
- SSVC:
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical Impact: partial
netty-transport-sctp: Netty-transport-sctp: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth from SctpMessage fragments
Additional References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46340
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2488388
- https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-46340.json
References
- https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-5xrh-qmmq-w6ch
- https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Final
- https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Final
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