CVE-2026-45552

Summary

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the install blueprint declares only bp.before_request → @jwt_required() (app/routes/install/routes.py:36-39). The individual endpoints install_exporter, install_waf, install_geoip, check_geoip, get_exporter_version, and get_task_status are not wrapped in page_for_admin and do not call roxywi_common.is_user_has_access_to_its_group(server_ip) or check_is_server_in_group(server_ip). Only the GET index page (install_monitoring) gates on roxywi_auth.page_for_admin(level=2). Because the missing decorators omit both role and group checks, any logged-in user — including the default guest role 4 — can install/reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on every server in the Roxy-WI database, regardless of tenant ownership. The Ansible playbooks run with the per-server SSH credential stored in Roxy-WI, which the credentials' rightful owner (a different tenant) has provisioned with sudo rights for the management workflow. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Affected Software

Weaknesses

• CWE-639: CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
• CWE-862: CWE-862: Missing Authorization
• CWE-863: CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

ADP Enrichment

CISA ADP Vulnrichment

• SSVC:
• Exploitation: poc
  • Automatable: no
  • Technical Impact: total

References

• https://github.com/roxy-wi/roxy-wi/security/advisories/GHSA-v3f8-g2v8-jq5h

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