CVE-2026-33757
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Summary
OpenBao is an open source identity-based secrets management system. Prior to version 2.5.2, OpenBao does not prompt for user confirmation when logging in via JWT/OIDC and a role with callback_mode set to direct. This allows an attacker to start an authentication request and perform "remote phishing" by having the victim visit the URL and automatically log-in to the session of the attacker. Despite being based on the authorization code flow, the direct mode calls back directly to the API and allows an attacker to poll for an OpenBao token until it is issued. Version 2.5.2 includes an additional confirmation screen for direct type logins that requires manual user interaction in order to finish the authentication. This issue can be worked around either by removing any roles with callback_mode=direct or enforcing confirmation for every session on the token issuer side for the Client ID used by OpenBao.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| openbao | openbao | < 2.5.2 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-384: CWE-384: Session Fixation
ADP Enrichment
CISA ADP Vulnrichment
- SSVC:
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical Impact: total
OpenBao: lack of user confirmation for OpenBao OIDC direct callback mode
Additional References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-33757
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2452269
- https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-33757.json
References
- https://github.com/openbao/openbao/security/advisories/GHSA-7q7g-x6vg-xpc3
- https://github.com/openbao/openbao/commit/e32103951925723e9787e33886ab6b6ec20f4964
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628#section-5.4
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