CVE-2026-18036
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber
Summary
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, NTRU reduced secret values with the % operator in three helpers whose reference implementations are deliberately division-free, so each reduction was carried out by an integer division whose latency depends on the secret operand. Polynomial.modQ divided by a variable divisor, which a compiler cannot strength-reduce to a multiply the way it can a constant one, so it emitted a division on every call including on the decapsulation path where the dividend derives from the private key; Polynomial.mod3 and NTRUSampling.mod3 divided the secret key polynomials f and g during key generation, the message polynomials r and m during encapsulation, and coefficients recovered during decapsulation. An attacker able to measure that timing can recover information about the NTRU private key. modQ now masks, which is exact because q is always a power of two, and mod3 uses the reference implementation's division-free fold and select; the results are unchanged.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. | BC-JAVA | 1.73 < 1.86 | affected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-208: CWE-208 Observable Timing Discrepancy
ADP Enrichment
CISA ADP Vulnrichment
- SSVC:
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical Impact: partial
References
- https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9018036
- https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/9c9ad88b6003bb6230d2434bd892cc1e95b294e4
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