CVE-2026-15144

Summary

@fastify/rate-limit before 11.2.0 keys rate-limit buckets by the verbatim client IP string returned from request.ip. Because a single IPv6 client can control a large address range (a /64 holds 2^64 distinct addresses) and the same address has multiple valid textual representations, an IPv6 capable client can defeat the rate-limit boundary by rotating addresses or by rewriting the same address in different forms. Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.2.0, where the default key generator normalizes IPv6 addresses to their canonical form, collapses IPv4 mapped IPv6 to IPv4, and applies a configurable prefix mask (default /64) via a new ipv6Subnet option.

Affected Software

Weaknesses

• CWE-307: CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
• CWE-770: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

ADP Enrichment

CISA ADP Vulnrichment

• SSVC:
• Exploitation: none
  • Automatable: yes
  • Technical Impact: partial

References

• https://github.com/fastify/fastify-rate-limit/security/advisories/GHSA-grpc-p53c-r64v
• https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html

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