CVE-2026-101087
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L
Summary
Nezha versions 2.0.10 through 2.3.2 use a restricted HTTP client to validate user-configurable notification and DDNS webhook URLs, but the denylist did not cover IPv6 transition ranges — specifically the 6to4 prefix 2002::/16 and the local-use IPv4/IPv6 translation prefix 64:ff9b:1::/48. Because such addresses satisfy Go's netip.Addr.IsGlobalUnicast check, the URL validator accepted them. An authenticated user able to configure a webhook may be able to cause the dashboard to issue requests to an otherwise restricted IPv6 endpoint, but only where the dashboard's network provides unusual or non-standards-compliant routing for these transition ranges; no direct path to an IPv4 metadata, loopback, or private-network HTTP request has been demonstrated. The issue is fixed in version 2.3.3 (commit d1fcde8e), which blocks both prefixes.
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Version Range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| nezhahq | nezha | 2.0.10 < 2.3.3 | affected |
| nezhahq | nezha | 2.3.3 | unaffected |
Weaknesses
- CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
References
- https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-jr2j-7hvh-h4q9
- https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/commit/d1fcde8e
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nezha-2.0.10-through-2.3.2-ssrf-denylist-bypass-ipv6
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