CVE-2022-48853

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE

The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering cve-2018-1000204.

A short description of what happens follows:

  1. The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR is not reading from the device.
  2. In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is allocated with GFP_ZERO.
  3. For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device and the buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
  4. When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second (that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all zeros. Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to the user-space buffer.
  5. The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized, ain't all zeros and fails.

One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well behaved).

Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten, in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance impact of the extra bounce.

Affected Software

VendorProductVersion RangeStatus
LinuxLinux1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < fd97de9c7b973f46a6103f4170c5efc7b8ef8797affected
LinuxLinux1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < aaf166f37eb6bb55d81c3e40a2a460c8875c8813affected
LinuxLinux1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < 06cb238b0f7ac1669cb06390704c61794724c191affected
LinuxLinux1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < b2f140a9f980806f572d672e1780acea66b9a25caffected
LinuxLinux1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < f3f2247ac31cb71d1f05f56536df5946c6652f4aaffected
LinuxLinux1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < 7007c894631cf43041dcfa0da7142bbaa7eb673caffected
LinuxLinux1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < dcead36b19d999d687cd9c99b7f37520d9102b57affected
LinuxLinux1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < f2141881b530738777c28bb51c62175895c8178baffected
LinuxLinux1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 < 901c7280ca0d5e2b4a8929fbe0bfb007ac2a6544affected
LinuxLinux2.6.12affected
LinuxLinux0 < 2.6.12unaffected
LinuxLinux4.9.320 <= 4.9.*unaffected
LinuxLinux4.14.281 <= 4.14.*unaffected
LinuxLinux4.19.245 <= 4.19.*unaffected
LinuxLinux5.4.196 <= 5.4.*unaffected
LinuxLinux5.10.118 <= 5.10.*unaffected
LinuxLinux5.15.33 <= 5.15.*unaffected
LinuxLinux5.16.19 <= 5.16.*unaffected
LinuxLinux5.17.2 <= 5.17.*unaffected
LinuxLinux5.18 <= *unaffected

Weaknesses

ADP Enrichment

CVE Program Container

Additional References

CISA ADP Vulnrichment

  • SSVC:
  • Exploitation: none
    • Automatable: no
    • Technical Impact: partial

References